Seitzinger v. Reading Hospital by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-19-1999 
Seitzinger v. Reading Hospital 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"Seitzinger v. Reading Hospital" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 10. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/10 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed January 15, 1999 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
NO. 97-1698 
 
SHARYN L. SEITZINGER, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE READING HOSPITAL AND 
MEDICAL CENTER 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-05926) 
District Judge: Honorable E. Mac Troutman 
 
Argued: November 16, 1998 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
and McLAUGHLIN, District Judge.* 
 
(Filed January 15, 1999) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin, United States District Judge for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
  
       STEPHEN M. LATIMER, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       LUCILLE M. ROSANO, ESQUIRE 
 
       Loughlin & Latimer 
       131 Main Street 
       Suite 235 
       Hackensack, NJ 07601 
 
       Counsel for Appellant 
 
       VINCENT CANDIELLO, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 
       One Commerce Square 
       417 Walnut Street 
       Harrisburg, PA 17101 
 
       Counsel for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal by plaintiff Sharyn Seitzinger in a Title VII 
case alleging gender and age discrimination by her former 
employer, defendant Reading Hospital and Medical Center, 
requires us to decide when the circumstances surrounding 
an attorney's misconduct are sufficient to merit equitable 
tolling of the statute of limitations. The appeal perforce 
centers on the timeliness of the complaint. The District 
Court granted summary judgment for the Hospital, 
believing the complaint to be time-barred under 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-5(f)(1) because it was not filed within ninety days of 
the receipt of the EEOC's right-to-sue letter. The Court 
rejected Seitzinger's fall-back position that the time 
deadline should have been extended under the doctrine of 
equitable tolling because of the defalcations of her lawyer, 
who missed the filing deadline, albeit only by one day. 
 
We agree with the district court's basic timeliness 
determination and affirm on that point. However, we 
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disagree on equitable tolling. The district court proceeded 
on the theory that an attorney's delinquency is chargeable 
to the client and, at all events, is not a basis for equitable 
tolling. This is generally true, consistent with the rule that 
equitable tolling is to be used sparingly, particularly in the 
context of attorney default. However, where -- as here -- 
the allegation is that a diligent client persistently 
questioned the lawyer as to whether he had filed the 
complaint in time, and he affirmatively misrepresented to 
her that he had, we think there is a sufficient claim of 
attorney abandonment to bring the case within the narrow 
line of cases in which lawyer misconduct justifies equitable 
tolling. 
 
Because the District Court erroneously thought that 
equitable tolling could not be justified here, we will reverse. 
Because the equitable tolling determination turns on a 
weighing and balancing of factors, including the extent of 
attorney misconduct, the diligence of the client, and 
prejudice to the defendant, we think it preferable to offer 
the District Court the opportunity to exercise its discretion 
and make the tolling determination in the first instance. 
Hence, we will remand for further consideration. 
 
I. 
 
Seitzinger started work at Reading Hospital in 1984. In 
May, 1993, she had an argument with her office manager 
and was suspended. She later was given the option to 
resign or be fired, and she opted to resign. A few months 
later, she filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging age and 
gender discrimination. The EEOC concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence of a gender discrimination claim. At this 
point, Seitzinger retained an attorney named David Sloane 
to help her with her case. However, after attempts at 
reconciliation between Seitzinger and the Hospital failed, 
the EEOC declined to transfer Seitzinger's case to its Legal 
Unit and, in a letter dated May 30, 1995, notified Seitzinger 
of its intention to issue to her, under separate cover, a 
right-to-sue letter. The letter also stated that she could file 
a lawsuit within ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue 
letter. 
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On June 15, 1995, the EEOC sent the right-to-sue letter 
to Seitzinger, Sloane, and Reading Hospital. The Hospital 
received its copy of the right-to-sue letter on June 19. 
Seitzinger does not know when she and Sloane received 
their copies of the letter; she does not recall receiving her 
letter, and Sloane had recently changed his address. The 
first postmark on Sloane's letter was June 15, and the 
second postmark, on the "change of address" label, was 
June 17. Soon after receiving the letter, Seitzinger decided 
to bring a Title VII suit against the Hospital. On July 2, 
1995, Sloane wrote to Seitzinger, advising her that he was 
in the process of drafting the complaint. Seitzinger called 
Sloane in early September to make sure that he hadfiled 
the complaint on time. Sloane assured Seitzinger that he 
had done so. However, Sloane did not actually file the 
complaint until September 19, 1995. 
 
On June 7, 1996, the District Court dismissed 
Seitzinger's complaint without prejudice for failure to serve 
Reading Hospital with the complaint. At some point that 
spring, Sloane told Seitzinger, who had repeatedly called 
him to ask for a copy of the complaint and to inquire about 
the status of her case, that he was giving up his law 
practice. In fact, Sloane had been suspended from the 
practice of law in October 1995. After picking up her file 
from Sloane, Seitzinger called the Clerk of the District 
Court to check on the status of her case and was told that 
her complaint had been dismissed. 
 
On September 22, 1996, Seitzinger moved to vacate the 
dismissal because her attorney had failed to serve the 
complaint and had been disbarred in July 1996. Although 
the District Court granted her motion to vacate, and 
Seitzinger timely served the Hospital with a notice of the 
complaint, the District Court subsequently granted the 
Hospital's motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that the complaint was not timely filed. This appeal 
followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. Our review of the district court's grant of the 
Hospital's motion for summary judgment is plenary, see 
Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 
1990), and we must construe the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, see Gallo v. City of 
Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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II. 
 
We must initially decide whether Seitzinger has 
introduced sufficient evidence to identify the date on which 
she or Sloane received the EEOC's right-to-sue letter, for it 
is from that date that we determine whether Seitzinger's 
complaint was timely filed in federal court. If Seitzinger has 
failed to do so, we will apply the Federal Rules' 
presumption that a party receives a document three days 
after it was mailed, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e), in which case 
we would begin to count from June 18, 1995, and 
Seitzinger's complaint would not be timely. Even if she has 
produced some evidence that we should begin to count 
from June 19, we conclude that there is still no genuine 
issue of material fact bearing on timeliness because the 
ninety-day period still expired before she filed her claim.1 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(f)(1) provides that if the EEOC takes 
no action on a complaint within a specified period of time, 
the agency "shall so notify the person aggrieved and within 
ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may 
be brought . . . ." Id. We have construed this provision to 
mean that the time for the filing of a complaint begins to 
run when the plaintiff has notice of the EEOC's decision, 
which usually occurs on the date he receives a right-to-sue 
letter from the agency. See Mosel v. Hills Dep't Store, Inc., 
789 F.2d 251, 252 (3d Cir. 1986). The EEOC's right-to-sue 
letter also informs the claimant that he or she has ninety 
days after receipt in which to file suit. See id. at 252-53. 
Therefore, the date on which Seitzinger received the letter 
becomes critical. 
 
When the actual date of receipt is known, that date 
controls. Dixon v. Digital Equip. Corp., 1992 WL 245867, *1 
(4th Cir. Sept. 30, 1992) (unpublished disposition); Peete v. 
American Standard Graphic, 885 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1989). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The statutorily-created ninety-day period starts when either the 
claimant or her attorney receives a right-to-sue letter, whichever is 
earlier. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 92-93 
(1990) (notice is received when the EEOC delivers its letter to a claimant 
or the claimant's attorney). Because we conclude that Seitzinger received 
the letter no later than June 19, the date on which her attorney received 
his letter is irrelevant. 
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However, in the absence of other evidence, courts will 
presume that a plaintiff received her right-to-sue letter 
three days after the EEOC mailed it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
Rule 6(e); Mosel, 789 F.2d at 253 n.2 (stating that the 
Supreme Court has suggested that Rule 6(e) applies when 
parties dispute the date of receipt). Rule 6(e)'s three-day 
presumption attempts to ensure that the plaintiff has the 
benefit of the full ninety-day period when the date of actual 
receipt is unknown. 
 
Seitzinger states that she does not recall receiving a 
right-to-sue letter directly from the EEOC. Nevertheless, the 
right-to-sue letter was addressed to her at the address at 
which she has received information from the EEOC since 
this action began. Seitzinger offers only one piece of 
evidence to suggest that she may have received her letter 
after June 18: the Hospital received its copy of the letter on 
June 19. While this evidence may not be of sufficient 
weight to rebut Rule 6(e)'s presumption, we need not decide 
this issue: even if we were to assume that the date the 
Hospital received its copy of the right-to-sue letter was the 
date on which Seitzinger received hers, she still failed to file 
her complaint within ninety days of June 19. Ninety days 
from June 19 is September 17. Since September 17 was a 
Sunday, Seitzinger had until September 18 to file her 
complaint. Because she, through her attorney, did not file 
the complaint until September 19, she failed to meet the 
EEOC's ninety-day filing period. 
 
III. 
 
Anticipating that the District Court might conclude that 
her complaint was not timely, Seitzinger asked the District 
Court to equitably toll the ninety-day period so that her 
suit would be deemed timely filed. The Court refused to do 
so, concluding that dereliction of counsel was an 
insufficient reason to invoke equitable tolling. The law is 
clear that courts must be sparing in their use of equitable 
tolling. There are, however, narrow circumstances in which 
the misbehavior of an attorney may merit such equitable 
relief. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Knoxville Community Dev. Corp., 
60 F.3d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1995) (equitable tolling may 
be appropriate where attorney has abandoned client). 
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As a preliminary matter, we note that it is settled that the 
ninety-day time limit in which a plaintiff mustfile a Title 
VII action is akin to a statute of limitations rather than a 
jurisdictional bar. Therefore, the time limit is subject to 
tolling. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 
U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding that time limits in Title VII 
are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of 
limitations); Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 
38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that time limits 
set forth in Title VII are analogous to statutes of limitations 
and are subject to equitable modifications). 
 
Under equitable tolling, plaintiffs may sue after the 
statutory time period for filing a complaint has expired if 
they have been prevented from filing in a timely manner 
due to sufficiently inequitable circumstances. Ellis v. 
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706 (11th 
Cir. 1998); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 696 
(9th Cir. 1981); Mathews v. Little, Civ. A. No. 92-CV-1114, 
1992 WL 192542, *2 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1992). The caselaw 
is instructive. The Supreme Court has held that equitable 
tolling may be appropriate when a claimant received 
inadequate notice of her right to file suit, where a motion 
for appointment of counsel is pending, or where the court 
has misled the plaintiff into believing that she had done 
everything required of her. See Baldwin County Welcome 
Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984). In United States v. 
Midgley, 142 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 1998), we expressed a 
willingness to invoke equitable tolling in a number of other 
circumstances: when the defendant has actively misled the 
plaintiff; when the plaintiff "in some extraordinary way" was 
prevented from asserting her rights; or when the plaintiff 
timely asserted her rights in the wrong forum. See id. at 
179; Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1387. See also Miller v. New 
Jersey State Dep't of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (equitable tolling is an appropriate remedy when 
principles of equity would make a rigid application of the 
statute of limitations unfair); Shendock v. Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs, 893 F.2d 1458, 1462 (3d Cir. 
1990) (same). 
 
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 
the equitable tolling doctrine, it also has cautioned that 
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"[p]rocedural requirements established by Congress for 
gaining access to the federal courts are not to be 
disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for 
particular litigants." Baldwin, 466 U.S. at 152. We too have 
exercised caution in using the doctrine. In Mosel, we 
emphasized the importance of adhering to the EEOC's 
ninety-day filing period, holding that "in the absence of a 
recognized equitable consideration, the court cannot extend 
the limitations period by even one day." 789 F.2d at 253 
(citations omitted). We therefore approach the doctrine 
warily, so as to guard against possible misuse. 
 
Seitzinger alleges that the facts of her case fit into 
Midgley's second category: namely, that this is an 
"extraordinary" case where she was prevented from timely 
asserting her rights because of gross attorney error. The 
usual rule is that attorney errors will be attributed to their 
clients. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 252 
(1985) (client may be penalized for counsel's tardy filing of 
tax return); Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962) 
(client must suffer the consequence of dismissal of his 
lawsuit where his attorney failed to attend pretrial 
conference). 
 
Nonetheless, some courts have found it appropriate to 
toll the statute of limitations in cases of attorney mistake. 
See, e.g., Cantrell, 60 F.3d at 1180 (holding that where 
client was abandoned by attorney due to attorney's mental 
illness, equitable tolling may be appropriate). In Burton v. 
United States Postal Serv., 612 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (N.D. 
Ohio 1985), the court applied equitable tolling to the 
plaintiff's claim because his attorney "irresponsibly 
abandoned his client and the case and left town." Finding 
that the plaintiff had been diligent in pursuing his claim, 
that the defendant's interest in prompt notice of claims 
against it had not been substantially damaged by the delay, 
and that to penalize the plaintiff in this case would defeat 
the remedial purpose of Title VII, the court tolled the 
EEOC's filing deadline. Id. Likewise, in Volk v. Multi-Media, 
Inc., 516 F. Supp. 157, 161-62 (S.D. Ohio 1981), the 
plaintiff's attorney failed to timely inform the Department of 
Labor that his client intended to sue his former employer 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The 
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court took into account the fact that the plaintiff's attorney 
was inept and sloppy, that the defendant suffered no 
prejudice, and that the plaintiff was diligent infinding out 
about the ADEA and hiring an attorney. The court 
concluded that it was unwilling to visit the errors of that 
lawyer on his client. Id. at 162. 
 
In the context of a Title VII claim, the Supreme Court has 
warned, "[T]he principles of equitable tolling . . . do not 
extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of 
excusable neglect" by an attorney. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. In 
Irwin, the plaintiff's lawyer was out of the country when the 
right-to-sue letter was delivered to his office. Although the 
statute of limitations in that case was thirty days, the 
lawyer filed suit forty-four days later, albeit only twenty- 
nine days after his client received his copy of the letter. 
Since the lawyer's only excuse was his absence from the 
office, the Court refused to apply equitable tolling. See id. 
We therefore must decide whether Sloane's behavior, as 
reflected by the present record, is of a type that goes 
beyond garden variety neglect. 
 
We conclude that it is. Sloane's level of misbehavior went 
well beyond the garden variety, because Sloane 
affirmatively lied to his client. When she called Sloane in 
early September to check on the status of the complaint, 
Sloane assured her that he had filed it, when in fact he had 
not. In addition, he promised her a number of times that he 
would send or had sent her a copy of the complaint, yet he 
never did. We agree with the Hospital that the mere fact 
that counsel failed to file the complaint in a timely manner 
probably constitutes garden variety neglect. But his 
affirmative misrepresentations to his client about the very 
filing at issue here rise above that standard. The Supreme 
Court's declaration in Irwin that garden variety attorney 
neglect is an insufficient reason to invoke equitable tolling 
therefore does not control the outcome in this case. 
 
We conclude that Seitzinger has adduced facts sufficient 
to overcome summary judgment on the equitable tolling 
issue. First (and importantly), Seitzinger appears to have 
been extremely diligent in pursuing her claim. See Irwin, 
498 U.S. at 96 (implying that the Court has been more 
forgiving of late filings where claimant exercised due 
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diligence in preserving his rights); New Castle County v. 
Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(stating that to invoke equitable tolling, a party must show 
that it exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and 
bringing its claims). She hired an attorney to help her file 
her civil complaint. She contacted him before thefiling 
deadline, which she knew about in broad terms, to ensure 
that he had filed the complaint. In addition, she repeatedly 
called him, requesting a copy of the complaint and seeking 
information on how her case was progressing.2 We think 
that these examples of her consistent assiduousness, if 
true, would weigh heavily in favor of equitable tolling. 
 
In addition to Seitzinger's diligence as a client, it is 
important to consider whether she had actual or 
constructive notice of the filing requirement, and whether 
her lack of knowledge was reasonable. It appears from the 
facts before us that she lacked notice of the exact date on 
which her complaint had to be filed, although she had a 
general idea that her complaint had to be filed towards the 
end of September. It may be that her lack of knowledge of 
the specific filing date was not reasonable, since she 
received the EEOC's letter, but then again her putative 
knowledge may have been eroded by her attorney's 
misrepresentations. Moreover, the defendants have 
proffered no evidence of prejudice as a result of the one- or 
two-day delay in filing. Although courts may not rely on 
lack of prejudice as a determinative factor, once a factor 
that might justify equitable tolling is identified, prejudice is 
a factor to be considered. See Baldwin, 466 U.S. at 152. 
 
Given this welter of material, countervailing factors, we 
believe that the District Court was mistaken in concluding 
that Seitzinger has not presented material issues of fact 
such that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that her 
diligence, coupled with her attorney's direct lies about 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that she continued to be diligent after she learned that her 
attorney had effectively abandoned her. She picked up her files from him 
and contacted the District Court to check on the status of her case. She 
consulted with ten to fifteen attorneys, trying to determine whether there 
was a way to get her case reinstated by the Court. Finally, she moved 
(successfully) for the District Court to vacate the dismissal of her case. 
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whether he had filed her complaint and an absence of 
prejudice to the defendant, created a situation appropriate 
for tolling. We must therefore reverse the grant of summary 
judgment. However, since the sensitive decision as to 
whether to equitably toll the time limit involves weighing 
and balancing (and possibly further factual development), 
we will leave the decision of whether to apply equitable 
tolling to the discretion of the District Court in the first 
instance. The judgment of the District Court will be 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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